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We develop a two-country (North and South), two-good, general
equilibrium model of international trade in goods and explore the ef-
fects of domestic and international emission trading under free trade in
goods. Whereas domestic emission trading in North may result in car-
bon leakage by expanding South’s production of the emission-intensive
good, international emission trading may induce North to expand the
production of the emission-intensive good by importing emission per-
mits. Emission trading may deteriorate global environment. North’s
(South’s) emission trading may not beneﬁt South (North). Interna-
tional emission trading improves global eﬃciency but may not beneﬁt
both countries.
Keywords: global warming, emission quota, emission trading, carbon leak-
age, Kyoto Protocol
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To combat global warming, an international environmental treaty, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was made
at the Earth Summit in 1992. Then the ﬁrst session of the Conference of
Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC was held in Berlin in 1995. Since then, the
COP has met every year. Among these COP sessions, the third session,
so called COP3, is the most noteworthy, because the Kyoto Protocol was
adopted.
In the protocol, two important agreements were made. First, the indus-
trialized countries called Annex I Parties made a commitment to decrease
their greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions to 5.2% below their 1990 baseline lev-
els over the 2008 to 2012 period. Second, three market-based mechanisms,
so called the Kyoto mechanisms, were introduced. These three mechanisms
are emission trading, clean development mechanism and joint implementa-
tion. In particular, emission trading, meaning the creation of markets to
freely trade emission permits, has attracted considerable attention. For ex-
ample, the European commission states that market-based carbon trading
is an instrument for countries to reach their targets at least cost.
Recently, discussions on a post-Kyoto framework have been getting ac-
tive. The Kyoto Protocol is a notable step towards the reduction of GHG,
but a major drawback is that developing countries have no obligation to
the reduction.1 Moreover, it is expected that emission trading is inevitable
for many countries to meet their targets, but emission trading (interna-
tional emission trading especially) has not been well developed. Therefore,
the post-Kyoto framework needs to design an international emission trading
system that involves developing countries,2 particularly the fastest-growing
emitters such as China and India.3 However, international trade in emission
permits has not been investigated satisfactorily.
In this paper, we explore the eﬀects of domestic emission trading and
international emission trading between developed countries (North) and de-
1The United States, which is a signatory to the protocol, has not ratiﬁed the protocol.
2Frankel (2007) proposes a formula for setting emission targets, which can entice de-
veloping as well as developed countries to join a post-Kyoto system of emission trading
with targets.
3According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China became the largest CO2
emitter in 2007. The shares of CO2 emissions in the world were 21% for China and 20%
for the United States. The IEA expects that the China’s share will be about 28% in 2030.
1veloping countries (South). To this end, we develop a two-country (North
and South), two-good, general equilibrium model of international trade in
goods and emission permits. The two goods are produced using a primary
factor, called labor. Following an idea of Meade (1952), however, we speciﬁ-
cally regard GHG emissions as an input of environmental resources for pro-
duction.4 In our model, the government sets an aggregate level of domestic
GHG emissions, which can be implemented by issuing tradable emission
permits. Moreover, we speciﬁcally focus on the case with a technology gap
between North and South. To be concrete, North requires less labor and
generates less emissions in the production of the emission-intensive good.5
We ﬁrst explore the eﬀects of domestic emission trading in North alone
under free trade in goods and then consider a situation where South also
introduces domestic emission trading. In our analysis, domestic emission
trading means that an emission quota implemented by issuing the emission
permits that can be traded freely within the economy. After examining
domestic emission trading, we allow international trade in emission permits
to analyze international emission trading.
Our model is built on Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006) that develops a model
having both Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin features to compare diﬀerent
measures of emission regulations in an open economy. In particular, North
has a comparative advantage in the production of the emission-intensive
good. This feature enables us to examine economic and environmental ef-
fects of emission trading between developed and developing countries. How-
ever, Ishikawa and Kiyono examine unilateral emission regulations (includ-
ing emission quotas) alone. Thus, emission trading is allowed only within
North in their analysis. We extend their analyses to the case of “bilateral”
emission regulations.
We show that North’s emission trading under free trade in goods may
result in carbon leakage by expanding South’s production of the emission-
intensive good, while international emission trading under free trade in goods
may induce North to expand the production of the emission-intensive good
4For example, Copeland and Taylor (1994), Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006), and Abe et
al. (2011) follow this idea.
5For example, Japanese technology of manufacturing steel is one of the most eﬃcient
and most energy-saving technologies in the world. According to the Asia-PacﬁcP a r t n e r -
ship Clean Development and Climate, 130 million tons of CO2 can be reduced without
aﬀecting the total output if Japanese technology is used by steel mills in the USA, China,
Korea, Australia, and Canada.
2by importing emission permits. Emission trading in North alone may in-
crease global GHG emissions. We point out, however, that North may have
incentive to introduce emission trading even if total world emissions increase.
It is also shown that either North or South may suﬀer from international
emission trading.
Copeland and Taylor (2005) develop a general equilibrium model of in-
ternational trade and examine the welfare eﬀects of emission trading. They
consider a Heckscher-Ohlin model with three countries (i.e., two North coun-
tries: West and East, and South) and assume that West and East are con-
strained by the emission treaty, but South is not. It is shown that emission
trading between West and East may make them worse oﬀ and may not cause
carbon leakage in South although South is free from emission control. Unlike
Copeland and Taylor, we use a model having both the Heckscher-Ohlin and
Ricardian features, and show that emission trading may not beneﬁtb o t h
North and South.6
Kiyono and Ishikawa (2010) explore emission taxes and quotas in the
presence carbon leakage caused by changes in the fossil fuel price. Con-
structing a three-country model (two fossil-fuel-consuming countries and one
fossil-fuel-producing country) which explicitly takes trade in fossil fuel into
account, they also show that permit trade between the fossil-fuel-consuming
countries may not beneﬁt them. In their analysis, trade in fossil fuel, which
is absent in our model, plays a crucial role.
Our work is also related to the literature on trade theory with capital
mobility.7 We regard GHG emissions as an input for production, which
enables us to treat trade in emission permits like trade in inputs such as
capital. Nonetheless, unlike capital, the emission of GHG is a global public
bad. Thus, we evaluate the welfare eﬀect of emission trading in terms of
the global environment quality in addition to the standard eﬀects of factor
6As is well known, in the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the factor prices are equalized in
free trade equilibrium when countries are incompletely specialized. This property holds
in Copeland and Taylor (2005) so that the prices of emission permits are equalized in free
trade equilibrium with incomplete specialization. Obviously, in such an equilibrium, there
is no incentive for trade in emission permits. To consider permit trade between countries,
they assume that West is completely specialized in the clean good, while East produces
both clean and dirty goods. As a result, permits are exported from East to West. In
our model, the asymmetric technology results in a diﬀerence in the permit prices between
countries. In particular, North imports permits from South.
7See Mundell (1957), Jones (1980), Brecher and Choudri (1982), Markusen (1983),
Grossman (1983), Jones (2000), and Yomogida (2006), among others.
3mobility. Moreover, the level of emissions is not ﬁxed unlike the stock capital
being ﬁxedly endowed and fully employed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop
a basic model. In Section 3, we consider the eﬀects of domestic emission
trading in the North-South model. In Section 4, we explore international
emission trading under free trade in goods. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
In this section, we present a basic model. Without any emission regulation,
the model is simply Ricardian. That is, two goods are produced using a
single factor (labor) with a constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) technology and
consumed by the household. Production of both goods emits greenhouse
gases (GHG) and deteriorates the global environmental quality leading to
damages on the household. To examine emission trading, we ﬁrst intro-
duce domestic emission trading under free trade in goods and then consider
international emission trading.
2.1 Production Technology
We ﬁrst describe the production technology of each good. Two goods (X
and Y ) are produced using a single factor (labor) with a CRS technology.
The labor coeﬃcient of good i (i = X,Y) is given by ai(> 0). Perfect
competition prevails in the economy. The endowment of labor is given by
L. Labor can freely move between two sectors and is fully employed.
Production of one unit of good i (i = X,Y) emits ei(> 0) units of GHGs.
GHGs reduce economic welfare, but does not generate production external-
ities. Following the idea of Meade (1952), we may regard GHG emissions
as the input of the environmental resource for producing goods. This envi-
ronmental resource is an unpaid factor of production and socially overused
without any regulation. The environmental regulation is thus a policy to
internalize the social opportunity cost of the environmental resource into
the private evaluation of costs and beneﬁts. Hereafter, we refer to the envi-
ronmental resource as emissions for simplicity.
Therefore, both goods X and Y require both labor and environmental
resources for production. That is, the output of good i (i = X,Y) is a
function of labor input, Li, and the amount of GHG emissions generated
4during production, Zi. For simplicity, we assume away the substitutability
between labor and emissions, that is, we do not allow emission abatement
through labor input:8













Obviously, if there is no environmental regulation, ﬁrms would not pay for
emissions and the model is simply Ricardian.
For the following analysis, we deﬁne the emission intensity of production







and impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Good X is relatively more emission-intensive than good Y .
That is, zX >z Y holds.
2.2 Emission Quotas
We assume that under free trade in goods, the government sets an aggregate
level of domestic GHG emissions which is denoted by Z.T oi m p l e m e n tt h e
emission level, the government issues Z units of the emission permit that
c a nb et r a d e df r e e l yw i t h i n the economy. Full employment of labor is still
assumed in the presence of the emission quota. Noting Assumption 1, we
impose the following assumptions:
Assumption 2 A2 - 1 :Z/eY >L / a Y
A2 - 2 :Z/eX <L / a X
The ﬁrst assumption is necessary to guarantee full employment of la-
bor, while the second assumption makes the quota binding. This can be
8We can incorporate emission abatement through labor input into the model such as
in Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006). In this case, the production possibility frontier (Figure 1),
the unit cost curves (Figure 2), and the relative supply curve (Figure 3) have somewhat
diﬀerent shapes. KN becomes strictly concave to the origin in Figure 1; a part of each
unit cost curve becomes strictly convex to the origin in Figure 2; and KS is not vertical
but upward-sloping in Figure 3 (for details, see Ishikawa and Kiyono, 2006). However,
these changes make the analysis complicated without gaining further insights.
5conﬁrmed by the production possibility frontier (PPF) in Figure 1. Factor
constraints are represented by
aXX + aY Y = L,
eXX + eY Y ≤ Z.
Since producers do not incur the cost of emitting GHG without the emission
quota, the PPF is illustrated by a downward straight line as in the Ricar-
dian model (MM0 in Figure 1). After the government imposes the total
emission quota on production activities and creates the market for trading
emission permits, producers would incur the costs of emissions. Given the
total emission quota Z, the PPF is illustrated as MKN in Figure 1. Under
Assumption 2, point K, the coordinates of which are
µ
ZaY − LeY
eXaY − eY aX
,
LeX − ZaX
eXaY − eY aX
¶
, (1)
is located between M and M0. Full labor employment is realized on MK
and both factor constrains are binding only at point K.
We next determine the wage rate, w, and the price of the permit, r.T h e
unit cost function of good i (i = X,Y) is expressed by
ci(r,w)=rei + wai.
Letting good Y be the numeraire, we have the following conditions under
perfect competition:
cX(r,w) ≥ p,cY (r,w) ≥ 1,
where p is the (relative) price of good X. The unit cost curves are illustrated
in Figure 2: XX0 for good X and YY0 for good Y . As long as the quota is
binding, both labor and emission permits are fully used and hence point B
determines the wage rate and the permit price:9
r =
−aX + paY
eXaY − eY aX
,w=
eX − peY
eXaY − eY aX
.
9If the quota is unbinding, then r =0holds. In this case, point Y determines the wage
rate (w =1 /aY )a sl o n ga sg o o dY is produced.
62.3 Relative Supply Curve
The relative supply curve is illustrated in Figure 3. Before an emission
quota is introduced, the relative supply curve is given by OMM
00
.T h a ti s ,
the relative supply curve coincides with the vertical axis for 0 <p≤ pA
(where pA(≡ aX/aY ) is the autarky price) and is horizontal at p = pA.
When an emission quota is introduced, the relative supply curve becomes
as follows. As long as the quota is unbinding (p ≤ pA), the relative supply
curve coincides with that of the Ricardian case (i.e., OMK). When the
quota is binding (p ≥ pA), there are two cases. If production takes place
at the kinky point K on the PPF (see Figure 1), then the relative supply
curve becomes vertical at K (i.e., KS)i nF i g u r e3 . 10 If production takes
place at point N on the PPF, the relative supply curve becomes horizontal
at S (i.e., SN). Thus, the relative supply curve is given by OMKSN.I t
should be noted that only KS is consistent with both binding quotas and
full employment of labor.
2.4 National Welfare
The national welfare of the country is measured by the utility enjoyed by





where Xc, Y c, u(·),a n dZW, respectively, denote the consumption of good
X, the consumption of good Y , the sub-utility function, and world total
GHG emissions. We impose the following assumption on the household’s
utility function.
Assumption 3 The household’s utility function satisﬁes the following prop-
erties.
A3 - 1 :U(u,ZW) is (i) strictly increasing in the sub-utility u (ii) strictly
decreasing in ZW, and (iii) twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
A3 - 2 :u(Xc,Yc) is (i) strictly increasing in the consumption of each good,
(ii) twice-continuously diﬀerentiable, (iii) strictly concave, and (iv)
10As the emission quota becomes tighter, KS moves to the left. When point K coincides
with M (M
0)i nF i g u r e1 ,p o i n tK coincides with M (M
0) in Figure 3 as well. The








7homothetic. It also satisﬁes (v) limχc→+0
∂u(χc,1)/∂Xc
∂u(χc,1)/∂Y c =+ ∞ and
limχc→+∞
∂u(χc,1)/∂Xc
∂u(χc,1)/∂Y c =0 ,w h e r eχc ≡ Xc/Y c.
Given Assumption 3, the relative demand for good X, χD(p), depends
only on its relative price p and is decreasing in p.
3 North-South Model
In this section, we consider a two-country (North and South) model where
emission quotas are introduced under free trade in goods. North is a devel-
oped country, while South is a developing country.
3.1 Free Trade in Goods without Emission Quotas
We ﬁrst consider free trade in goods without emission quotas. For this, we
impose the following assumption regarding technologies:11
Assumption 4 A 4-1: North and South have the same technology of pro-
ducing good Y , that is, aY = a∗
Y , eY = e∗
Y .




The second assumption implies that North can produce good X more
eﬃciently with less emissions than South. Under Assumption 4, North has
a comparative advantage in good X.12 Under free trade, therefore, North
and South specialize in good X and good Y , respectively, and at least one
country is completely specialized. That is, one of the following three cases
arises:
1. North and South completely specialize in good X and good Y , respec-
tively;
2. North is diversiﬁed, while South completely specializes in good Y ;
3. North completely specializes in good X, while South is diversiﬁed.
11South’s variables and parameters are denoted by asterisk.
12Even if North has an absolute advantage in both goods in terms of the labor produc-
tivity, i.e., aY <a
∗
Y and aX <a
∗
X , we can derive the same results as long as North has a





8These cases are shown in Figures 3 and 4. In Figure 3, the world relative
supply curve is given by OMM0M∗0
M∗”, while three downwards sloping
curves are possible relative demand curves showing the relative demand for
each country as well as the world. Point Ti (i =1 ,2,3) shows the associated
free-trade equilibrium corresponding to Case i above. Figure 4 illustrates
the world PPF, MM0M∗”.I nt h eﬁgure, MM0 corresponds to North’s PPF
and M∗0
M∗” corresponds to South’s PPF. Moreover, point Ti (i =1 ,2,3)
in Figure 4 corresponds to that in Figure 3.
3.2 Introduction of Domestic Emission Quotas
We now examine the introduction of an emission quota with the creation
of the domestic market to trade emission permits in each country. We ﬁrst
consider the case in which only North introduces an emission quota and then
the case in which South also introduces an emission quota. To focus on the
case where labor is fully employed in the presence of emission quotas, we
impose the following assumption.13
Assumption 5 eX/eY >a ∗
X/a∗
Y
Suppose that under free trade in goods, a domestic emission quota is in-
troduced in North alone and that the quota is binding. Assumption 5 implies
that SN is located above M∗M∗” in Figure 3. In Figure 4, North’s quota
shifts the world PPF from MM0M∗00
to MKM∗00
N M0
N.14 In Figure 5, North’s
relative supply curve is given by OMKSN, while South’s relative supply
curve is given by OM∗M∗”
.15 The world relative supply (X+X∗)/(Y +Y ∗)
becomesOMKTMTK∗TST.16 Point Ei shows a possible world trading equi-
librium. Point Ei (i =1 ,2,3,4) in Figure 4 corresponds to that in Figure
5. We should mention that the world relative supply curve with North’s
emission quota is located to the left of that without it, OMM0M∗0
M∗”,a n d
hence the world price of good X, pW, rises as a result of North’s emission
quota.
13This assumption is satisﬁed when eY ≈ 0.W h e n eY =0 ,w ed on o tn e e dt h i s
assumption.
14With Assumption 5, the slope of KM
∗




N.N o t et h a t




N, labor unemployment arises.
15SN is not illustrated in Figures 5 and 6.
16K
TM
T that is located between MM
∗ and KS,w h i l eK
∗TS
T is located to the right
of KS.
9Intuitively, North’s quota increases pW, because the quota decreases the
supply of good X and increases the supply of good Y in North. Depending
on the resulting world price, three cases are possible. First, if pW <p ∗
A ,t h e n
South remains to completely specialize in good Y (point E1, for example).
Second, if pW = p∗
A, then South as well as North is diversiﬁed (points E2
and E3, for example).17 Third, if pW >p ∗
A , South completely specializes in
good X.W i t hpW >p ∗
A, therefore, the trade pattern is reversed, that is, the
introduction of North’s emission quota leads North to export good Y and
South to export good X (point E4, for example). We should mention that
the trade pattern is reversed even with pW = p∗
A if the relative demand curve
cuts the world relative supply curve to the right of North’s relative supply
curve. If they intersect at point E3, for example, the autarky relative price
is given by point A in North and by point E3 in South, and North exports
good Y and imports good X under free trade.18
North’s quota under free trade in goods could cause carbon leakage, that
is, North’s quota could reduce North’s GHG emissions, but increase South’s
emissions by expanding South’s production of good X. Unless South remains
to completely specialize in good Y , the carbon leakage necessarily occurs.
In fact, world total GHG emissions could rise as a result of North’s emission
quota. This is more likely to occur when e∗
X is suﬃciently large relative to
eX.
Thus, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that only North introduces a domestic emission
quota. Then pW rises. The carbon leakage exists when pW ≥ p∗
A in equi-
librium. If e∗
X is suﬃciently large relative to eX, then world total GHG
emissions may increase due to the carbon leakage. The trade pattern is re-
versed (i.e., North exports good Y and imports good X)o n l yi fpW ≥ p∗
A
in equilibrium. In particular, the trade pattern is necessarily reversed if
pW >p ∗
A.
We now consider the introduction of a domestic emission quota in South
in the presence of North’s quota. This is illustrated in Figures 6 (a) and (b).
Suppose that South’s emission quota makes South’s relative supply curve
17Strictly speaking, if the intersection point is M
T (K
∗T), then South remains to com-
pletely specialize in good Y (X).
18Here, the autarky price is hypothetical one, because emission quotas are introduced
under free goods trade and hence are absent under autarky.
10OM∗K∗S∗. As a result of South’s quota, K∗TST shifts to the left and is
located between KS and K∗S∗. As long as the quota level is large, K∗S∗ is
located to the right of KS (Figure 6 (a)). As South’s quota becomes tighter,
both K∗TST and K∗S∗ shift to the left. However, K∗S∗ shifts more than
K∗TST and K∗S∗ particularly coincides with K∗TST on KS. Eventually,
K∗S∗ shifts to the left of KS (Figure 6 (b)). Since K∗TST shifts to the left
by tightening South’s quota, pW increases. South’s quota makes the world
PPF MKK∗M0
SM∗”
S in Figure 4. Point E0
4 in Figure 4 corresponds to that
in Figure 6 (a).
Noting (1), we can easily verify the following lemma:
Lemma 1 K∗S∗ i sl o c a t e dt ot h er i g h to fKS if and only if (Z∗aY −
L∗eY )/(L∗e∗
X − Z∗a∗
X) > (ZaY − LeY )/(LeX − ZaX).
We should mention that there is no eﬀect at all when South’s quota is
unbinding. In the following analysis, therefore, we focus on the case where it
is binding. If the equilibrium remains to be at the same point (say, point E3
in Figures 6(a)) after the introduction of South’s emission quota, the quota
is not binding. This is because a binding quota decreases the supply of good
X and increases that of good Y and hence pW rises. That is, South’s quota
is binding if pW >p ∗
A (point E0
4 in Figure 6 (a)) but is unbinding if pW ≤ p∗
A
(points E1, E2 and E3 in Figure 6 (a)).19
The following should be noted. First, even if South’s quota is binding,
world total GHG emissions could be greater relative to the case without any
emission quota in both countries. This is because North’s quota could cause
international carbon leakage and increase world total GHG emissions before
South’s quota is introduced. Second, South’s quota may reverse the trade
pattern. When the trade pattern is reversed by North’s quota, this pattern
could be reversed again by South’s quota (for example, point E”
4 in Figure 6
(b).20 If North’s quota does not reverse the trade pattern, then the pattern
remains unchanged even in the presence of South’s quota.
Therefore, the following proposition is established.
19Strictly speaking, if the intersection point is K
∗, then South’s quota is just binding.
20In the absence of South’s quota, the autarky relative price is given by A in North
and by A
∗
1 in South in Figure 6 (b). Thus, North imports good X and p
W is determined
somewhere between A and A
∗
1. In the presence of South’s quota, however, South’s autarky
relative price is given by A
∗
2 and North exports good X.
11Proposition 2 Suppose that South also introduces a binding emission quota.
Then pW rises and pW >p ∗
A holds. North exports good X and imports good
Y if and only if (ZaY −LeY )/(LeX−ZaX) > (Z∗aY −L∗eY )/(L∗e∗
X−Z∗a∗
X).
We next examine the welfare eﬀects of the introduction of domestic emis-
sion quotas. Three eﬀects are generated by the emission quotas. That is, the
emission quotas aﬀect world total GHG emissions (henceforth the emission
eﬀect), pW (henceforth the terms-of-trade (TOT) eﬀect), and the production
possibility set (PPS) (henceforth the PPS eﬀect).
When only North introduces an emission quota, we have three cases to
analyze. In the ﬁrst case, South remains to completely specialize in good
Y . North’s emissions decrease, while South’s emissions remain unchanged.
Therefore, both countries gain from the reduction of world total GHG emis-
sions. However, the quota also generates the other two eﬀects. Since the
world output of good X falls, pW rises. Thus, North beneﬁts from the im-
provement of the TOT, because North remains exporting good X with the
quota. That is, the TOT eﬀect is positive for North. At the same time,
however, the PPS shrinks in North (see Figure 1). In general, therefore, it is
ambiguous whether North gains from introducing an emission quota. Simi-
larly, South may or may not gain, because the global environment improves
but the TOT for South deteriorate.
In the second case, South is diversiﬁed. In this case, the carbon leakage
occurs and hence world total GHG emissions may increase. North gains
from an increase in pW unless the trade pattern is reversed. If the trade
pattern is reversed, then, because of both TOT and PPS eﬀects, North’s
consumption point is located in KNM0 in Figure 1. Thus, the sub-utility
necessarily falls in North. Since South’s TOT coincide with the autarky
relative price, the TOT eﬀect is necessarily negative for South regardless of
trade patterns. If North’s emission quota raises world total GHG emissions,
South loses.
In the third case, South completely specializes in good X.A s i n t h e
second case, the carbon leakage exists. Since the trade pattern is reversed,
the combination of the TOT eﬀect and the PPS eﬀect is adverse to North.
South may or may not gain from an increase in pW. Again the welfare eﬀects
are generally ambiguous for both countries.
The following should be noted. First, North has no incentive to volun-
tarily introduce emission quotas if it loses from them. In particular, this
12i st h ec a s ei fa l lt h r e ee ﬀects are detrimental to North. Thus, when the
trade pattern is reversed (which necessarily occurs with pW >p ∗
A ), it is
inferred that North’s quota decreases world total GHG emissions regardless
of the carbon leakage. Second, North could gain even if world total GHG
e m i s s i o n si n c r e a s ea sar e s u l to fi t se m i s s i o nq u o t a .T h i si st h ec a s ei ft h e
positive TOT eﬀect dominates the negative emission and PPS eﬀects. Thus,
North may be willing to introduce emission quotas not because emissions
fall but because the TOT improve.
Thus, we obtain the following proposition when only North introduces
an emission quota and North gains from it.
Proposition 3 Suppose that pW 6= p∗
A holds under North’s quota. Then,
world total GHG emissions decrease but South’s welfare may not improve.
Suppose that pW = p∗
A holds under North’s quota. Then, North may have an
incentive to introduce an emission quota even if world total GHG emissions
increase. South gains only if world total GHG emissions decrease.
We now consider the case in which South introduces a domestic emis-
sion quota in the presence of North’s quota. When South’s quota is binding,
world total GHG emissions obviously fall. Thus, the emission eﬀect is pos-
itive for both countries. The adverse PPS eﬀe c ta r i s e so n l yi nS o u t h . A n
increase in pW is favorable for the country remaining to export good X
and is unfavorable for the other country. If North remains to export good
X (good Y ), then the TOT eﬀect is beneﬁcial (detrimental) to North. If
South’s quota leads North to export good X,t h eT O Te ﬀect may or may
not be beneﬁcial to North. A tighter emission quota decreases the emis-
sions more. However, the PPS shrinks to a larger extent and South is more
likely to import good X. Thus, although North is more likely to prefer a
tighter quota in South, South may introduce only a lax quota. North may
lose from South’s emission quota if South’s quota does not induce North to
export good X.
Thus, noting Lemma 1, we obtain the following proposition when South
introduces a binding emission quota in the presence of North’s quota.
Proposition 4 North may or may not gain form South’s quota. If pW <p ∗
A
holds under North’s quota alone and (ZaY −LeY )/(LeX −ZaX) ≥ (Z∗aY −
L∗eY )/(L∗e∗
X − Z∗a∗
X) holds under both North’s and South’s quotas, then
North gains.
13C o m p a r i n gt h es i t u a t i o nw i t he m i s s i o nq u o t a si nb o t hc o u n t r i e sw i t ht h e
situation without any emission quota, we can state the following. Since world
total GHG emissions could be greater than those without any emission quota
because of carbon leakage caused by a North quota, the emission eﬀects are
ambiguous. The PPS eﬀect is detrimental to both countries. The TOT
eﬀect works positively for the country exporting good X and negatively for
the country importing good X.
Therefore, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 5 Suppose that North introduces an emission quota and then
South introduces an emission quota. Although each quota reduces GHG emis-
sions in each country, world total GHG emissions could increase relative to
the case without any emission quota. Both countries gain from such quotas
only if world total GHG emissions fall.
4 International Trade in Emission Permits
In this section, we introduce international emission trading into the model
and compare the case with international emission trading against the case
with domestic emission trading alone. When the emission permits can be
traded internationally, the production and trade patters of goods could be
aﬀected. We explore the eﬀects of international trade in emission permits.
To this end, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 6 Z +Z∗ < min{zXL,z∗
XL∗} holds, that is, the labor endow-
ment is large enough to absorb world total emission permits in both North
and South.
Under Assumption 4, the permit price is always higher in North than
in South. In Figure 2, the broken line X∗X∗0 is South’s unit cost curve
of good X. South’s unit cost curve of good Y is given by YY0, because
the technologies to produce good Y are identical between North and South.
The permit price and the wage rate are determined at point B in North
and at point B0 in South. Since X∗X∗0 is always located below XX0 with
Assumption 4, r>r ∗ always holds.21
21O n em a yt h i n ki ts o m e w h a tw e i r dt h a tN o r t h ’ sw a g er a t ei sl o w e rt h a nS o u t h ’ sw a g e
rate. However, when labor is measured by eﬃciency units, North worker could earn higher
wage if workers are more eﬃcient in North than in South.
14Under international emission trading, therefore, North imports the per-
mit from South. The output of good X increases but that of good Y de-
creases in North, and vice versa in South. Trade in permits continues until
South is completely specialized in good Y . Once South completely special-
izes in good Y , X∗X∗0 disappears and South’s permit price and wage rate
become equal to North’s. That is, South is completely specialized in good Y
and North is diversiﬁed in equilibrium under international emission trading.
Even if South exports good X without international emission trading, the
emission trading leads South to import good X from North.
Thus, we obtain
Proposition 6 Suppose that international trade in emission permits is al-
lowed. Then South is completely specialized in good Y by exporting permits
to North.
We next examine how international emission trading aﬀects the outputs.
Letting ∆Z(> 0) denote the traded permits, we obtain the following rela-
tions:
eX∆X + eY ∆Y = ∆Z,
e∗
X∆X∗ + eY ∆Y ∗ = −∆Z,
where ∆X and ∆Y are, respectively, the change in the output of good X














By noting that eX <e ∗
X, aX <a ∗
X,a n d(eX/eY ) − (aX/aY ) > 0 hold,
∆X+∆X∗ > 0 holds if and only if (eX/eY )−(aX/aY ) < (e∗
X/eY )−(a∗
X/aY ).
This condition is likely to hold when e∗
X is suﬃciently large relative to eX
and/or a∗
X is not very large relative to aX. In other words, international
emission trading is more likely to increase the world output of good X as















15Noting Assumption 1, we have ∆Y + ∆Y ∗ < 0 i fa n do n l yi f(eX/aX) <
(e∗
X/a∗
X), which is again likely to hold when e∗
X is suﬃciently large relative
to eX and/or a∗
X is not very large relative to aX.
In Figure 6, the world relative supply curve is given by OMKWSW.
Figure 6 (a) shows a case where KWSW is located to the left of K∗TST,
while Figure 6 (b) illustrates a case where KWSW is located to the right
of K∗TST.22 When both emission quotas are binding before international
emission trading, pW ≥ p∗
A holds (i.e., the relative demand curve intersects
KTMTK∗TST on K∗TST). Therefore, international emission trading lowers
t h ew o r l dp r i c eo fg o o dX i fa n do n l yi fKWSW is located to the right of
K∗TST in Figure 6. Noting that South is completely specialized in good
Y a n da n dN o r t hi sd i v e r s i ﬁed under international emission trading, we






























Y + Y ∗
¶
KWSW
where e Z ≡ Z+Z∗−(L∗eY /aY ). This condition is more likely to be satisﬁed
when e∗
X is suﬃciently large relative to eX and/or a∗
X is not very large
relative to aX.
Thus, the following lemma is established:
Lemma 2 International emission trading between North and South lowers











Next, we examine the impact of international emission trading on wel-
fare. International emission trading changes the world outputs of goods X
and Y ,w h i c ha ﬀects the TOT for goods. Since all permits are used with
and without international emission trading, however, international trade in
p e r m i t sd o e sn o ta ﬀect world total GHG emissions.
22K
WS





1 ,u 1) − E(1,p W
1 ,u 0) ≥ (pW
1 − pW
0 )(X0 − Xc
0),
where E is the expenditure function. Subscripts 0 and 1, respectively, denote
the equilibrium before and after international emission trading. u1 >u 0
holds if (pW
1 − pW
0 )(X0 − Xc
0) > 0. When free trade in goods has already
been established, the welfare eﬀect of international emission trading crucially
depends on the TOT for goods. For example, if North exports good X
without international emission trading, i.e., with X0 >X c
0, North (South)
beneﬁts from international emission trading if pW rises (falls). We should
mention that trade in permits improves global eﬃciency, but both countries
may not gain.24
The above analysis establishes the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Suppose that international trade in emission permits does
not change the pattern of trade in goods (i.e., North exports good X without
t r a d ei np e r m i t s ) . T h e ni ft h ew o r l dp r i c eo fg o o dX rises (falls), North
(South) gains from international emission trading but South (North) may
lose. Suppose that international trade in emission permits changes the pat-
tern of trade in goods (i.e., North exports good Y without trade in permits).
T h e ni ft h ew o r l dp r i c eo fg o o dX rises (falls), South (North) gains from
international emission trading but North (South) may lose.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We explored domestic emission trading and international emission trading
between the developed country (North) and the developing country (South).
To this end, a simple two-country, two-good, general equilibrium model was
developed. We ﬁrst introduced North’s emission quota into a Ricardian
trade model in which North has a comparative advantage in the emission-
intensive good. Then we introduced South’s emission quota in the presence
of North’s emission quota. Finally, we examined international trade in emis-
sion permits between the two countries.
23The proof is provided in the Appendix. The same condition is found in the case of
capital movements (see Grossman, 1984).
24In Figure 4, the equilibrium with international emission trading is given by a point
between K and M
0 and hence global eﬃciency is improved.
17We speciﬁcally focused on the case in which North can produce the
emission-intensive good more eﬃciently with less emissions. Whereas North’s
domestic emission trading under free trade in goods may result in carbon
leakage by expanding South’s production of the emission-intensive good, in-
ternational emission trading induces North to expand the production of the
emission-intensive good by importing emission permits. When only North
introduces an emission quota, total world emissions may increase due to
carbon leakage. North’s emission quota may not beneﬁt South. Similarly,
South’s emission quota (in the presence of North’s quota) may not beneﬁt
North. International emission trading generates two eﬀects: the standard
gains from trade in emission permits and the changes in the TOT for goods.
Although trade in permits improves global eﬃciency, one country suﬀers
from a deterioration of the TOT. Thus, international emission trading may
not beneﬁt both countries.
Final remarks are in order. First, in our analysis, we did not explic-
itly consider the optimal emission quotas. This is mainly because welfare
crucially depends on how the eﬀects of world total GHG emissions are eval-
uated. If the damage from GHG emissions is highly evaluated, for example,
the emission eﬀect dominates the other two eﬀects (the TOT and the PPS
eﬀects) and hence tough emission quotas are desirable.
Second, emission regulations may induce ﬁrms to circumvent them. When
only North introduces regulations, North ﬁrms may move to South to avoid
burdens.25 Firms may also have an incentive to abate emissions. In partic-
ular, ﬁrms may invest in developing new technologies to reduce emissions.
Moreover, North ﬁrms may have an incentive to transfer their technologies
to South in the presence of clean development mechanism. To investigate
R&D and technology transfer, however, we need models that explicitly deal
with ﬁrm behaviors.
Last, it would be interesting to take into account strategic behaviors of
two countries. For example, when North introduces its emission quota, it
may expect the introduction of South’s emission quota and international
trade in permits and move strategically. Moreover, even if South loses from
South’s quota in the presence of North’s quota, South may gain by intro-
ducing South’s quota and international emission trading simultaneously.
25Regarding FDI caused by environmental regulations, see Markusen et al. (1993,1995)
and Ishikawa and Okubo (2008,2010), for example.
18The investigations along the above remarks are left for the future analy-
sis.
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Appendix: The Welfare Eﬀect of International Emis-
sion Trading
From the utility function (2), the welfare eﬀect can be decomposed into two
components: the eﬀect on the sub-utility u and that on world total GHG
20emissions ZW. In this appendix, we show that the eﬀect of international
emission trading on the sub-utility u crucially depends on the TOT.
Using the expenditure function E(·) and the revenue function R(·),w e
have
E(1,p W
1 ,u 1)=R(1,p W
1 ,L) − r∆Z
≥ Y0 + pW
1 X0


















0 )(X0 − Xc
0)
≥ E(1,p W
1 ,u 0)+( pW
1 − pW
0 )(X0 − Xc
0)
where subscripts 0 and 1, respectively, denote the equilibrium before and
after international emission trading. Thus, we obtain
E(1,p W
1 ,u 1) − E(1,p W
1 ,u 0) ≥ (pW
1 − pW
0 )(X0 − Xc
0).
This implies that trade in emission permits enhances North’s welfare if (pW
1 −
pW
0 )(X0 − Xc





0 ) > 0 holds.
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